Competition and Information transition in dynamic markets
Scientific-Disciplinary Group
13/ECON-01 - Economics
Description
Recognized straightforward translation taskThis project, at the intersection of Calvano's and Cetemen's ERC grants, studies information transmission and competition in dynamic markets. It comprises three parts. The first builds a canonical continuous-time framework for dynamic games with asymmetric information, without behavioral types, establishing the existence of equilibrium. The second applies the framework to a dynamic model of limit pricing, uncovering a novel trade-off — strategic delay — with direct implications for antitrust policy. The third analyzes, through simulations, algorithmic pricing in markets with incomplete information, filling a gap in the literature. The project combines game-theoretic foundations and computational methodology to provide positive and normative analyses relevant to the debate on predatory pricing and algorithmic collusion.
Compensation
39,224 Euro
Job posting website
Number of positions
1
Maximum duration
24.0
Funding body
Luiss Guido Carli
View the original posting on the MUR website: Go to MUR website